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JUDICIAL SELECTION: IT'S MORE ABOUT THE CHOICES THAN
WHO DOES THE CHOOSING
Honorable Lavenski R. Smith*
I. INTRODUCTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE JUDICIARY TO DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNMENT
America's founders valued freedom. They staked their lives, fortunes,
and sacred honor on a national vision that made government the people's
servant. To achieve that vision, they circumscribed governmental authority
to certain limited purposes and segregated its power among three discrete
branches, each insufficient to govern legitimately without the other. They
hoped that, so limited, such a government would be sufficiently useful to
their goals of prosperity and security, yet not so powerful as to threaten their
cherished and recently blood-bought liberties.
Central to the founders' vision was a well-qualified and independent
judiciary. As stated in Federalist No. 78:
The complete independence of the courts ofjustice is peculiarly essential
in a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand one
which contains certain specified exceptions to the legislative authority;
such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex-post-
facto laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in
practice no other way than through the medium of the courts of justice,
whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of
the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular
rights or privileges would amount to nothing.'
America entrusts the third branch of government to approximately
12,000 federal and state judges.2 All 868 Article III federal judges are se-
* Judge Smith was confirmed to the United States Court of Appeals for the 8th Cir-
cuit in July 2002. Prior to his federal service, Judge Smith served two years on the Arkansas
Supreme Court and three and a half years on the Arkansas Public Service Commission in-
cluding two as its Chairman. Before his government work, Judge Smith practiced law and
taught as an assistant professor at John Brown University. Early in his career Judge Smith
was a staff attorney with Ozark Legal Services and a volunteer attorney for the Rutherford
Institute. Judge Smith is a member of the American Judicature Society, the American Inns of
Court, the Arkansas Bar Association and the W. Harold Flowers Law Society.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
2. American Judicature Society, Methods of Judicial Selection,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial-selection/methods/selection-ofjudges.cfin?state=
(last visited Jan. 11, 2008) [hereinafter AJS, Methods of Judicial Selection]; Office of the
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lected through the constitutionally-mandated nomination and confirmation
process.3 State judges, however, are selected through an assortment of
means, predominately through election, although an increasing number of
state judges are selected through some form of merit selection or appoint-
ment.4 The debate has long raged regarding which of these selection
processes is superior, and no end to the argument is in sight.5
II. THE GOAL OF THE JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS SHOULD BE TO SELECT
GOOD JUDGES AND TO BUILD PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE JUDICIARY
Arkansas's more than 134 trial and appellate judges are selected by
popular election from self-declared candidates who meet certain minimum
constitutional and statutory qualifications.6 Does this method provide Ar-
kansas with capable and ethical judges for their judicial system? Could some
other method do a better job of selecting Arkansas's judges? Perhaps, but as
I have reviewed the literature and considered the subject, my conclusion is
that more emphasis should be placed on the qualities of those being chosen
for judicial service, regardless of the method employed to choose judges.
Judicial service is both an awesome privilege and a heavy responsibili-
ty. Persons fulfilling this role must possess personal character qualities and
employ legal procedures that enable the public to see that decisions are
made impartially and consistently with a solemn respect for the boundaries
of the judges' constitutional authority. The goal of any selection system
should be to choose quality persons to serve. Any selection process consis-
tent with the constitution that increases the likelihood that quality persons
will serve in the judiciary deserves serious consideration. Judges, regardless
of how chosen, who lack adequate legal acumen or ethical character will
shake public confidence in the legitimacy of judicial decision making and
thereby harm the whole of the republic. As stated by Chief Justice John
Marshall, "I have always thought, from my earliest youth 'til now, that the
greatest scourge an angry Heaven ever inflicted upon an ungrateful and a
sinning people was an ignorant, a corrupt, or a dependent judiciary."7 Justice
Marshall rightly feared the judiciary becoming legally unqualified and mo-
Comm'r for Fed. Judicial Affairs, Number of Federal Judges on the Bench as of January 1,
2008, http://www.fa.gc.ca/fia-cmf/ja-am/n-judges-juges-eng.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2008).
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
4. Kelly J. Varsho, In the Global Market for Justice: Who Is Paying the Highest Price
for Judicial Independence?, 27 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 445, 458 (2007).
5. Malia Reddick, Merit Selection: A Review of the Social Scientific Literature, 106
DICK. L. REv. 729, 729 (2002).
6. AJS, Methods of Judicial Selection, supra note 2.
7. John Marshall, Speech on Dec. 11, 1829, in PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE
VRGINIA STATE CONVENTION OF 1829-30, at 616 (Richmond ed., Samuel Shepard & Co.
1830).
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rally unfit to be trusted with a vital role in the preservation of constitutional
liberties.
III. UNETHICAL JUDGES DESTROY PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE JUDICIARY
Unethical judges erode the public's respect for and confidence in the
judiciary.8 Confidence is affected both by fact and perception. Judges must
be actually and apparently impartial. The types of jurists who serve on the
bench have a significant impact on whether "a feeling of injustice" exists
among the people.9 Regardless of the substantive law applied, throughout
history, all peoples "seem to have been unanimous in the desire for judges
who could be trusted to judge justly and without fear or favor."' This is
because the "quality of justice" is more dependent on the quality of the indi-
viduals administering the law rather than on the "content of the law they
administer.""
Alexander Hamilton identified the judiciary as the weakest of the three
branches of government, as it has "neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely
judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm
even for the efficacy of its judgments."'" Because the judiciary is viewed as
the weakest branch of government, "any power the judiciary holds derives
from respect given to its decisions, and that respect derives from public trust
in the impartiality of the court's decisions."' 3 Thus, the very appearance of a
judge's impropriety diminishes the public's confidence in a judge's impar-
tiality.' 4 The "continued vitality" of the judicial branch depends largely on
8. See James R. Noseda, Limiting Off-Bench Expression: Striking a Balance Between
Accountability and Independence, 36 DEPAUL L. REV. 519, 529 (1987); see also Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The Court's authority-
possessed of neither the purse nor the sword-ultimately rests on sustained public confidence
in its moral sanction."); Alex B. Long, "Stop Me Before I Vote for This Judge Again ": Judi-
cial Conduct Organizations, Judicial Accountability, and the Disciplining of Elected Judges,
106 W. VA. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (2003) ("The continued vitality of the judiciary depends in no
small measure on the public's confidence that judges are ethical and that justice is being
dispensed fairly and impartially.").
9. EVAN HAYNES, THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 3 (1944).
10. Id.
11. Id. at 5.
12. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 1.
13. Noseda, supra note 8, at 529.
14. Id.; see also Cynthia Gray, Avoiding the Appearance of Impropriety: With Great
Power Comes Great Responsibility, 28 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 63, 64 (2005) ("To hold
judges to the highest standards of ethical conduct, a code of judicial conduct must cover not
just the clear and obvious improprieties but indirect, disguised, or careless conduct that looks




the public's perception of the fairness and impartiality of judges. 5 In es-
sence, if the public perceives judges as being corrupt, such perception be-
comes a "form of reality."'
16
A comprehensive definition of "corruption" is "the use of public office
for private gain."' 7 Unethical or "corrupt" judicial behavior encompasses
many acts or perceived motives including the following:
(1) corrupt influence on judicial action; (2) questionable fiduciary ap-
pointments; (3) abuse of office for personal gain; (4) incompetence and
neglect of duties; (5) overstepping of authority; (6) interpersonal abuse;
(7) bias, prejudice, and insensitivity; (8) personal misconduct reflecting
adversely on fitness for office; (9) conflict of interest; (10) inappropriate
behavior in a judicial capacity; (11) lack of candor; and (12) electioneer-
ing and purchase of office.1
8
A "common thread" in most corrupt conduct is a "reliance upon secre-
cy and collusion."' 9 Corrupt officials, like a dank mildew, abhor sunshine.
Unethical conduct occurring within the judicial branch is perhaps more in-
imical to liberty than corruption occurring in the other two branches of gov-
ernment because the judiciary serves as "the failsafe between constitutional-
ism and a free-for-all or a Hobbesian state of nature."20 Some of the major
consequences of having a corrupt judiciary include unpredictable judicial
opinions (or perhaps too predictable judicial opinions based upon the
judge's politics or personal interests), low public opinion, deprivation of fair
judicial procedures, and inflated transaction costs. 2' A 1995 public opinion
poll revealed that only 8% of Americans "had a great deal of confidence in
the judiciary, though 80% believe that the judges are fair and honest in their
decisions. ' '22 Similarly, a national survey conducted in 1999 found that (1)
public confidence in the judicial branch was below the confidence level that
people had in the other two branches; (2) 81% of respondents felt that poli-
tics influenced judges; (3) 80% of respondents felt that wealthy people re-
15. Long, supra note 8, at 8-9.
16. Honorable Bruce M. Selya, The Confidence Game: Public Perceptions of the Judi-
ciary, 30 NEw ENG. L. REv. 909, 909-10 (1996).
17. Maria Dakolias & Kim Thachuk, Attacking Corruption in the Judiciary: A Critical
Process in Judicial Reform, 18 WIS. INT'L L.J. 353, 355 (2000).
18. Geoffrey P. Miller, Bad Judges, 83 TEX. L. REv. 431, 432-33 (2004); see also Dako-
lias & Thachuck, supra note 17, at 355 (stating that "corruption" includes fraud, extortion,
violence "and other forms of criminal activity").
19. Dakolias & Thachuck, supra note 17, at 355-56.
20. Id. at 363-64.
21. Id.at364-65.
22. Id. at 367.
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ceived better treatment than others by the courts; and (4) 50% of respon-
dents felt that minorities were treated worse than others by the courts. 3
Given the negative impact unethical behavior has on public confidence,
it stands to reason that impartial, ethical, and legally astute judges increase
public confidence in the judiciary. Judges exhibiting the following "judicial
traits" should build the public's confidence in the judiciary:
1. Judges should be cognizant of the great power they possess, as well
as its limits. 24 Judges who apply the law must be first committed to obeying
the law. The power to interpret the law is not the power to disregard it.
2. Judges should strive for unassailable impartiality. All persons should
expect fair consideration before any court of law and not suspect that the
judge is "distracted with any jarring interests."25 The judge must respect
people from every walk and station of life but give preference to none of
them.
3. Judges should readily admit to their mistakes when they occur, re-
cognizing that they are not immune to error.26 Judicial accountability really
begins neither at the ballot box nor with an impeachment bill in the House
of Representatives but in the conscience of the judge.
4. Judges should exhibit modesty on the bench instead of arrogance,
acknowledging that judicial service is public service and not a license to
display one's supposed superiority.27
5. Judges should always tell the truth. The public has the right to know
how judges arrive at their conclusions and should not be deceived as to how
judges reach their decisions. "Public confidence in the judiciary increases
when the public is told the truth.
2
Indisputably, we need good judges, and such judges should possess
"honesty and courage; wisdom and learning; the kind of humility that
enables a man to rise above the faults and prejudices of his own inner self,
and to see and think and decide on higher ground., 29 Accordingly, a primary
goal of any judicial selection system should be to "maintain public confi-
23. Varsho, supra note 4, at 447.
24. Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a
Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REv. 16, 61 (2002).
25. John Adams, while discussing his views on government and in particular the impor-
tance of the judiciary, stated, "The judges, therefore, should be always men of learning and
experience in the laws, of exemplary morals, great patience, calmness, coolness, and atten-
tion. Their minds should not be distracted with jarring interests; they should not be dependent
upon any man, or body of men." JoHN ADAMS, THE REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS OF JOHN
ADAMs 291-92 (C. Bradley Thompson ed., 2000).
26. Barak, supra note 24, at 61.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 62.
29. HAYNES, supra note 9, at 8.
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dence in the fairness and integrity of the judicial system."3 Maintaining
public confidence in the judiciary "does not require a belief that all judicial
decisions are wise, or all judicial behavior impeccable;" instead, it requires
"a satisfaction that the justice system is based upon values of independence,
impartiality, integrity, and professionalism and that, within the limits of or-
dinary human frailty, the system pursues those values faithfully."'
Judicial selection, regardless of method, must engender, or, at a mini-
mum, not undermine public confidence in judicial decision making: "The
effects on public confidence in the judiciary need to be considered with
every selection system because if large segments of the population lose faith
in the judiciary, 'justice is in very serious trouble."'32 The question is wheth-
er the method of judicial selection directly affects the public's confidence in
the judiciary and the judiciary's independence and accountability.33
IV. OVERVIEW OF STUDIES OF JUDICIAL ETHICS RELATIVE TO METHOD OF
SELECTION
Currently, five judicial selection methods "dominate state selection
systems, although some states tailor each selection method to their individu-
al needs."34 The five methods of selection are gubernatorial appointment,
legislative appointment, partisan elections, nonpartisan elections, and the
"merit system" or "Missouri Plan."35 A typical merit system is composed of
a nonpartisan judicial nominating commission that recruits and evaluates
judicial candidates.36 Thereafter, the commission supplies the governor with
a list of candidates.37 The governor then chooses a judge from that list.
-Judges chosen by the merit system are subject to a retention election at the
end of their term.38 In a retention election, "the only question on the ballot is
'should Judge X be retained in office?"' 3 9
30. Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., Observations on the Wyoming Experience with Merit Se-
lection of Judges: A Model for Arkansas, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 281, 289 (1995).
31. Okechukwu Oko, Seeking Justice in Transitional Societies: An Analysis of the
Problems and Failures of the Judiciary in Nigeria, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 9, 21 n.55 (quoting
Murray Gleeson, Chief Justice of Australia, Public Confidence in the Judiciary, Judicial
Conference of Australia, Launceston (Apr. 27, 2002)).
32. Varsho, supra note 4, at 455 (quoting JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY 2 (American Bar Assoc.
ed., 2003)).
33. Id. at 454.
34. Id. at 456.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 460.
37. Id.
38. Varsho, supra note 4, at 460.
39. Id.
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Only a small number of states use a gubernatorial or legislative ap-
pointment system to choose their judges.40 In contrast, approximately twen-
ty-one states employ an election system to initially select their judges.4, The
merit selection system is gaining acceptance and use in the states; approx-
imately fifteen states and the District of Columbia use a merit selection sys-
40. Id. at 458. According to the American Judicature Society, only six states utilize a
gubernatorial or legislative appointment system: California, Maine, New Jersey, New Hamp-
shire, Virginia, and South Carolina. American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the
States-Appellate and General Jurisdiction Courts: "Summary of lnitial Selection Methods,"
http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/Judicial SelectionCharts_1 1963761730
77.pdf (last visited Jan. 10, 2008) (hereinafter AJS, Summary of Initial Selection Methods).
More specifically, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Virginia use an
appointment system when initially selecting judges for trial courts of general jurisdiction. Id.
California, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Virginia use an appointment system to select
judges for their intermediate appellate courts. Id. Finally, California, Maine, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, South Carolina, and Virginia use an appointment system to select judges for
their courts of last resort. Id.
41. AJS, Summary of Initial Selection Methods, supra note 40. Alabama, Illinois, Loui-
siana, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia hold partisan elections. Id.
Nonpartisan elections are held in Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississip-
pi, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin.
Id. More specifically, Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennes-
see, Texas, and West Virginia hold partisan elections to select judges for trial courts of gen-
eral jurisdiction, whereas Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin use nonpartisan elections to choose judges for trial
courts of general jurisdiction. Id. To select judges for the intermediate appellate courts, Ala-
bama, Illinois, Louisiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas use partisan elections, while Arkan-
sas, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oregon,
Washington, and Wisconsin use nonpartisan elections. Id. Finally, in choosing judges for the
courts of last resort, Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and
West Virginia use partisan elections, while Arkansas, Georgia, Idaho Kentucky, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Washington, and
Wisconsin use nonpartisan elections. Id.
2008]
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tem to initially select their judges.42 Nine states combine merit selection with
other methods to create their own unique judicial selection system.43
When addressing the question of which system is the "best" method of
judicial selection, an appropriate and prudent inquiry is which system pro-
duces the most ethically sound jurists. Proponents of merit selection assert
that merit selection produces better qualified judges; as proof, "they claim
that discipline for judicial misconduct almost invariably involves elected,
not appointed judges."" Additionally, general agreement exists among legal
academics that "popular election is, on the whole, a poor method of select-
ing judges."'45 Some academics have asserted that the electoral process "has
not been an effective method of judicial discipline because voters are more
likely to vote out judges for unpopular decisions than for ethical infrac-
tions." 6
Studies-though scarce-addressing the ethical performance of judges
chosen under the various selection systems tend to show that elected judges
are disciplined more often than judges that are appointed through the merit
system.47 One of the earliest comparisons of the performance of merit-
42. Id. Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming
all use the merit system. Id. More specifically, sixteen states use the merit system to initially
select trial judges for courts of general jurisdiction: Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Mexico, Rhode Island, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming. Id. Eighteen states use the merit sys-
tem to select judges for their intermediate appellate courts: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Con-
necticut, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Ne-
braska, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Utah. Id. Finally, twenty-four
states use the merit system to select judges for their courts of last resort: Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming. Id.
43. Id. Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Missouri, New York, Oklahoma, South Dako-
ta, and Tennessee combine merit selection with other methods to choose their judges. Id.
More specifically, Arizona, Indiana, Kansas, and Missouri use "combined methods" to
choose their trial judges for courts of general jurisdiction. Id. This means that the states
choose some judges through merit selection, while others are chosen in competitive elections.
Id.
44. Judith L. Maute, Selecting Justice in State Courts: The Ballot Box or the Back-
room?, 41 S. TEX. L. REv. 1197, 1225-26 (2000); see also MAX BOOT, OUT OF ORDER 196-
97 (1999) ("It's no coincidence that virtually all examples of misconduct in this chapter in-
volve states that pick their judges through partisan elections.").
45. Long, supra note 8, at 15.
46. Id. at 16.
47. The reason that such few comprehensive studies exist on the discipline rate between
elected and appointed judges may be because state judicial conduct organizations vary sub-
stantially in their reporting of judicial discipline. Some organizations publish in-depth sum-
maries of discipline statistics, e.g., California Commission on Judicial Performance, whereas
others provide minimal information. See the American Judicature Society's website,
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selected judges and elected judges concluded that "a merit plan 'tend[ed] to
eliminate the selection of very poor judges.'
' 48
Evaluations of judicial discipline in three elective states--California,
Florida, and New York-show that "a sharp distinction is found between the
number of judges initially appointed and those initially elected. '49 Califor-
nia's Commission on Judicial Performance published a summary of discip-
line statistics from 1990 to 1999.50 That summary found "a disciplinary rate
per thousand judges of 29.8 for the initially appointed category [and] 43.6
for the initially elected."'" From 1970 to 2000, of the sixty-nine Florida
judges disciplined, "70% of the judges who were reprimanded and 83% of
those who were removed (or resigned with charges pending) had initially
been elected."52 Likewise, in New York City, of the forty-one limited juris-
diction judges disciplined from 1977 to 2002, "80% had been elected (from
among the 314 civil court judges) and only 20% appointed (from among the
288 family and criminal court judges). 53
In contrast to the studies in California, Florida, and New York City, the
Texas Judicial Conduct Commission released statistics in 1987 showing that
58% of the district and appellate judges sanctioned by that commission were
originally appointed; in contrast, only 42% of judges disciplined were origi-
nally elected.54
Following the lead of California, Florida, New York, and Texas, other
states should move away from a debate over which method of judicial selec-
tion is theoretically better from a political philosophy perspective. Instead,
states should focus on whether their current method of judicial selection,
whether electoral or merit based, is producing ethical and competent judges.
http://www.ajs.org/ethics/eth-conduct-orgs.asp, for a comprehensive list of state judicial
conduct organizations.
48. Reddick, supra note 5, at 743. The behavioral study covered trial court judges both
before and after Missouri's adoption of a merit system in 1940. Id. at 742. The conclusion
that merit-selected judges performed better than elected judges was reached based on attorney
evaluations of the judges' overall performances. Id. at 743. "While large proportions of both
merit and elected judges were ranked in the highest quartile, fewer merit judges were ranked
in the lowest quartile." Id. at 743-44.
49. Roy A. Schotland, New Challenges to States'Judicial Selection, 95 Geo. L.J. 1077,
1087 (2007).
50. Comm'n on Judicial Performance, State of California, Summary of Discipline Statis-
tics
1990-1999, at 6 (2002), available at http://cjp.ca.gov/Miscellaneous/Web%20Version.rtf
(last visited Jan. 10, 2008).
51. Schotland, supra note 49, at 1087-88.
52. Id. at 1088.
53. Id. (citing Steven Zeidman, To Elect or Not To Elect: A Case Study of Judicial Se-
lection in New York City 1977-2002, 27 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 791, 808-10 (2004)).
54. Franklin S. Spears, Selection of Appellate Judges, 40 BAYLOR L. REv. 501, 515-16
(1988) (citing Judicial Conduct Committees 1987 Report on Texas Judicial Discipline).
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V. ARKANSAS'S JUDICIARY IS LARGELY ETHICAL AND COMPETENT
Arkansas's current method of judicial selection is nonpartisan elec-
tions.55 Before 2000, the Arkansas electorate selected its judges through
partisan elections. 6 While several states have switched to merit selection
systems in recent years, Arkansas has declined to do so. 7 If Arkansas voters
are choosing largely ethical and competent jurists, then the necessity of
changing from an electoral system to a merit-based system is greatly dimi-
nished. In other words, we need not repair the unbroken.
Arkansas currently has 134 jurists serving its state courts: seven judge-
ships in the Arkansas Supreme Court, twelve judgeships in the Arkansas
Court of Appeals, and 115 judgeships in Arkansas circuit courts." From
1990 to 2007, one circuit judge was removed from office;59 seven judges
submitted letters of resignation and agreed never to serve in the Arkansas
judiciary; 60 four judges retired from office during the investigation;6 and
five judges resigned from office either prior to the formal disciplinary hear-
ing or during the investigation.62 Thus, seventeen judges over the past seven-
teen years have ended their service in office as a result of judicial discipli-
nary proceedings. Furthermore, since 1990, approximately sixty-five judges
have received a letter of admonishment, censure, suspension without pay,
55. In 2000, "the Arkansas electorate voted to adopt Amendment 80, which formally
changed Arkansas'[s] judicial selection method from partisan to nonpartisan elections."
American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States: Arkansas,
http://www.judicialselection.us/state/index.cfm?state=AR (last visited Jan. 11, 2008).
56. Id.
57. In 1991, the Arkansas Bar Association's judicial article task force and the Arkansas
Judicial Council sponsored Amendment (SJR-10), which "called for nonpartisan election of
trial judges and merit selection of appellate judges." Id. (emphasis added). "It passed the
senate, but failed by one vote to pass the house." Id.
58. AJS, Methods of Judicial Selection, supra note 2.
59. Sixth Judicial Circuit Judge Morris Thompson was removed from office on May 10,
2000. Ark. Judicial Discipline and Disability Comm'n, Commission Final Actions
(Sanctions), http://www.arkansas.gov/jddc/decisions.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2008) [herei-
nafter Commission Final Actions (Sactions)].
60. Id. Batesville Municipal Court Judge Roy Thomas, Melbourne District Court Judge
Steven D. Lawrence, Helena District Judge Sam Whitfield, Jr., Benton County West District
Judge Rodney Owens, Huntsville District Judge W.Q. Hall, Pike County District Judge Jim
Bob Steel, and Blytheville Municipal Court Judge Bill Ross all submitted letters of resigna-
tion and agreed never to serve in the Arkansas judiciary. Id.
61. Id. First Division Chancellor Charles Plunkett, Fifth Circuit/Chancery Court Judge
Benny Swindell, Court of Appeals Judge Judith Rogers, and First Division Circuit Court
Judge Norman Wilkinson agreed to retire. Id.
62. Id. Part-time Municipal Court Judge H. Paul Jackson of Berryville, District 18 East
Circuit and Chancery Judge Terry P. Diggs, Pulaski County Municipal Judge David Hale,
Municipal Judge William W. Watt of Little Rock, and Municipal Court Judge Stephen Mor-
ley of North Little Rock all resigned from office. Id.
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suspension with pay, informal adjustment, voluntary suspension pending
dismissal of criminal charges, letter of final action, informal resolution, or
reprimand from the Arkansas Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission
(the "Commission"). 63 Therefore, in total, approximately eighty-two judges
received some type of sanction from the Commission over a seventeen year
period. This averages to less than five judges receiving sanctions per year.'
These statistics demonstrate that few judges are sanctioned each year
by the Commission.65 But, what about the type and severity of the conduct
for which these judges received sanctions? As previously noted, in seven-
teen years, the Arkansas Supreme Court has formally removed only one
state judge from office pursuant to the recommendation of the Commis-
sion."
The judge who was removed from office had committed several of-
fenses, which, when combined, warranted his removal.67 First, after becom-
ing a judge, he continued representing two clients in litigation: a plaintiff in
a personal injury lawsuit and another plaintiff in a wrongful-death lawsuit in
Louisiana.68 After entering office, the judge continued to correspond with
opposing counsel and handle client affairs as an attorney normally would,
including using his chambers and judicial letterhead to complete settlement
of the case.69 Second, the judge declined to honor a subrogation agreement
with a union for medical expenses on the client's behalf.7° Eventually, the
judge and his client were sued, and judgment was obtained against them.'
Third, the judge failed to list the attorney's fees on his outside-income report
that he received from two settlements in 1993.72 In addition, he did not list
attorney's fees or income that he received from other attorneys and clients in
1993 and 1994. 73 The Commission also found that the judge did not file an
outside-income report with the Arkansas Supreme Court Clerk in 1996 or a
statement of financial interest with the Arkansas Secretary of State in
63. Id.
64. In reality, the Commission reported sanctioning one judge in 2007; two judges in
2006; one judge in 2005; four judges in 2004; two judges in 2003; four judges in 2002; eight
judges in 2001; seven judges in 2000; seven judges in 1999; five judges in 1998; ten judges
in 1997; four judges in 1996; seven judges in 1995; three judges in 1994; three judges in
1993; three judges in 1992; three judges in 1991; and eight judges in 1990. Id.
65. Obviously, these numbers do not account for unethical conduct that goes unreported.
66. Commission Final Actions (Sanctions), supra note 59.
67. Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm'n v. Thompson, 341 Ark. 253, 277, 16
S.W.3d 212,225 (2000).








1996.74 Finally, the Commission also took account of a variety of other
personal financial shortcomings of the judge including tax liability and car
tag misuse.75
This judge's conduct, while inexcusable, did not relate directly to his
behavior on the bench or his judicial decisions. The judge used bad judg-
ment in his personal affairs, but he was not removed for judging cases badly.
Moreover, the Commission commented to the Arkansas Supreme Court that
the "sheer number of violations committed over such a lengthy period of
time" led to its recommendation that Judge Thompson be removed.76
As to the judges that (1) submitted letters of resignation and agreed
never to serve in the Arkansas judiciary, (2) retired from office during the
investigation, or (3) resigned from office either prior to the formal discipli-
nary hearing or during the investigation, these judges' unethical conduct
covers both personal indiscretions and wrongful acts committed in their
capacity as judicial officers. For example, part-time Municipal Court Judge
H. Paul Jackson of Berryville resigned from office due to his questionable
personal and professional conduct, as the complaints against him:
alleged that the judge had been charged with unlawfully operating a mo-
tor vehicle while intoxicated, violating the implied consent law, and op-
erating a motor vehicle without a valid driver's license, presided at a
hearing where he assessed himself a fine for not having a valid driver's
license, failed to promptly administer his court or to comply with several
state statutes; and signed an order that he had prepared in his capacity as
an attorney, canceling a lien on land owned by a client.77
Likewise, Municipal Judge William W. Watt of Little Rock resigned
from office during the investigation of four complaints against him.78 First, a
state representative filed a complaint against the judge concerning his in-
volvement in presenting a check to that representative during a legislative
session on behalf of the Arkansas Municipal Judges Council.79 Second,
another complaint was filed regarding the judge's "operation of and com-
74. GRAY, supra note 68, at 106.
75. Between 1993 and 1997, fifty-nine checks were returned to Judge Thompson due to
insufficient funds, thereby "compromising his ability to sit on cases involving 'hot checks."'
Id. The judge was liable for $86,936.91 in delinquent federal income tax from 1994; as a
result, the IRS filed a notice of tax lien on Judge Thompson and his wife. Id. The judge re-
ceived a citation from police for "placing the license tag for his 1981 Toyota on his Ford
pickup truck," a misdemeanor. Id. He also deposited client funds from two settlements in his
personal operating account and disbursed checks to clients. Id.
76. Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm'n v. Thompson, 341 Ark. 253, 277, 16
S.W.3d 212, 225 (2000).
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ments by the judge in the truancy program in the municipal court."80 The
third and fourth complaints concerned Judge Watt's actions "as described by
the judge's testimony in the 'Whitewater' trial under a promise of immuni-
ty."
81
Municipal Court Judge Stephen Morley of North Little Rock had twen-
ty-six formal charges pending against him when he agreed to resign and
never again serve as a judge in Arkansas." The complaints against Judge
Morley related to both his personal and professional conduct, including alle-
gations that he threatened a process server, physically assaulted his first and
second wives, committed adultery, concealed a hit-and-run accident from
the police, filed a fraudulent claim, "attempted to use the prestige of his
judicial office to advance his private interest when dealing with the claims
adjuster," and possessed and sold marijuana.8 3
Similarly, part-time Batesville Municipal Court Judge Roy Thomas re-
signed from office after the Commission charged that he:
presided in proceedings involving his personal clients in eight cases;
made threatening remarks to an individual who filed a judicial ethics
complaint against him; attempted to use his judicial office to have a she-
riff 'help' him to have a speeding ticket dismissed; directed a police of-
ficer not to arrest and to release a minor in possession of three kegs of
beer; issued temporary driver's permits to people whose drivers licenses
had been revoked; used his judicial office to have a client released from
jail; after an improper ex parte meeting with defense counsel, dismissed
criminal charges against an individual, allowing the defense counsel to
use the dismissal to avoid a parole revocation; without the presence of or
notice to the prosecutor, accepted a guilty plea to a lesser charge; ac-
cepted gifts and favors from a car dealership while presiding over cases
involving that car dealership, ruling in favor of the car dealership 43
times and against it once; and wrote approximately 166 checks with in-
sufficient funds in the checking accounts.84
Based on the cases brought before the judicial discipline authorities in
Arkansas, these represent the worst examples of unethical conduct by Ar-
kansas judges over the past seventeen years. Based upon the number and
nature of these cases, Arkansas has a low reported incidence of judicial mis-




83. Morley, Nos. 94-163 & 96-107, Memorandum of Understanding (Ark. Discipline
& Disability Comm'n, August 7, 1997), available at
http://www.arkansas.gov/jddc/decisions.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2008).
84. GRAY, supra note 68, at 149-50.
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consistent with a state judiciary that is, on the whole, largely ethical and
competent.
VI. MEASURES TO BETTER INFORM THE PUBLIC
Short of transforming the judicial selection system to an appointment
and retention system, states that elect judges may want to consider adding
measures to better inform the public about candidates for judicial office. The
public, at present, is entirely dependent upon campaigns for their knowledge
of a judicial candidate's legal qualifications or personal qualities. Moreover,
because "judicial races generally draw less attention than races for promi-
nent executive or legislative positions . . . less information is generally
available on judicial candidates .. .,,"
At a minimum, states could consider forming judicial screening com-
mittees that perform rudimentary background checks on judicial candidates.
Such screening would at least provide the public with important information
about the judicial candidate's employment history and criminal history.
Also, as one author has suggested, judicial performance evaluations
could be incorporated into the election process.8 6 An evaluation commission
composed of both attorneys and non-attorneys would conduct the judicial
performance evaluations of judges running for reelection.8 7 This commission
would neutrally review the sitting judge's "impartiality, case management
skills, communication skills, command of substantive and procedural law,
temperament on the bench, and commitment to public service. ''8 Candidates
running for judicial office with no prior judicial experience would receive a
prospective performance evaluation. 89 This evaluation would examine the
candidate's skills and experience.90 After collecting the data, the evaluation
commission would analyze the information and then disseminate its analysis
to voters before the election.9' Given the general lack of information on
judicial candidates, states should pursue these types of measures so that vot-
ers do not "face a slate of judicial candidates about which they know noth-
ing particularly relevant, or even nothing at all.,
92
85. Jordan M. Singer, Knowing Is Half the Battle: A Proposal for Prospective Perfor-
mance Evaluations in Judicial Elections, 29 U. ARK. LITrLE ROCK L. REv. 725, 726 (2007).
86. Id. at 725.
87. Id. at 748.
88. Id. at 725.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Singer, supra note 85, at 725.
92. Id. at 726.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Diminishing the impact of undue partisan political influence upon judi-
cial selection makes good sense. Yet the notion that judicial selection can be
made entirely apolitical denies human nature and the nature of a democratic
system of government. Altering the selection method may move the political
influences from the ballot box, but it will not remove such influences all
together from any judicial selection process.93 For all its faults, politics is a
far better instrument voice than anarchy:
The reality of state judicial selection is that no one system will work for
all states. When considering a selection method, a state needs to balance
the conflicting ideas of independence and accountability. In addition, the
state needs to consider the effect of its selection method will have on the
diversity of the judiciary, along with the effect the selection method will
have on the public's confidence in the judiciary. Finally, states need to
consider their regulation of the judiciary as a supplement to initial selec-
tion methods to ensure the independence and integrity of the judiciary is
preserved after selection.
94
Non-election selection methods seem to do a better job of weeding out
the judges most likely to have ethical shortcomings. But the differences be-
tween elected judges and judges chosen through merit selection may not
warrant changing methods on that score alone. Other considerations, how-
ever, such as capacity to enhance diversity may tip the scale in favor of a
nonelective process.
93. Maute, supra note 44, at 1242.
94. Varsho, supra note 4, at 463-64.
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